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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
=
===================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=íÜÉ=ÑçìåÇ~íáçå=Ñçê=áååçî~íáçå======== - 155 - 
=
=
A Decision Support Model for Valuing Proposed Improvements 
in Component Reliability 
Presenter:  Dr. Keebom Kang joined the Naval Postgraduate School in 1988, where he 
teaches supply chain, logistics engineering and computer simulation modeling courses for the 
MBA program. His research interests are in the areas of logistics and simulation modeling in 
various military applications.  He received his Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering from Purdue 
University. Prior to joining NPS, he was on the faculty of the Industrial Engineering Department 
at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida (1983-1988). He had held visiting professor 
positions at Syracuse University (Summer, 1985), Georgia Institute of Technology (Fall, 2003), 
Asia Institute of Technology in Thailand (Winter, 2004), and Pohang Institute of Science and 
Technology in Korea (Spring, 2004). 
Presenter:  Michael Boudreau, Colonel, US Army (Ret), has been a senior lecturer at 
the Naval Postgraduate School since 1995.  While an active duty Army Officer, he was the 
Project Manager, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, 1992-1995.  He commanded the Materiel 
Support Center, Korea, 1989-1991 and the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant, 1982-1984.  COL 
Boudreau is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Defense Systems 
Management College; Army Command and General Staff College; Long Armour-Infantry 
Course, Royal Armoured Corps Centre, United Kingdom; and Ordnance Officer Basic and 
Advanced courses.  He holds a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree and Master’s of 
Business degree from Santa Clara University, California. 
Presenter:  Uday Apte, is Visiting Professor of Operations Management, Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and 
Associate Professor, Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX.  He 
teaches operations management courses in the Executive and Full-time MBA programs.  His 
areas of expertise and research interests are in service operations, supply chain management 
and globalization of information-intensive services.  
Prior to joining the Cox School, he worked for over ten years in managing information 
technology and operations functions in the financial services and utility industries.  Since then 
he has consulted with several major US corporations and international organizations including 
IBM, Texas Instruments, Nokia, Kinko’s, Nationwide Insurance, Nations Bank and The World 
Bank. 
He holds a PhD in Decision Sciences from the Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, where he taught in the MBA and undergraduate business programs for over ten 
years. His earlier academic background includes a MBA from the Asian Institute of 
Management, Manila, Philippines, and Bachelor of Technology from the Indian Institute of 
Technology, Bombay, India. 
Dr. Apte has published over 30 articles, five of which have won awards from professional 
societies.  His research articles have been published in prestigious journals including, 
Management Science, Journal of Operations Management, Decision Sciences, IIE 
Transactions, Interfaces, and MIS Quarterly.  He has co-authored one book, Manufacturing 










 Developing a methodology and a tool for estimating the operational availability (Ao) of a 
weapon system based on the component-level reliability and maintainability data is the goal of 
this research. Specifically, we present two spreadsheet models and one discrete-event 
simulation model using Arena simulation language.  The first two models support lifecycle cost 
calculations and are static in nature.  The third model incorporates the interactions among 
reliability, time to repair and operational availability into a discrete-event simulation model that 
can support a weapon-system-level risk analysis.  These models are developed as proof-of-
concept to demonstrate the potential methodology using hypothetical, yet realistic data.  
Introduction 
The US Department of Defense is engaged in a number of management initiatives 
(related to weapon system logistics and support) intended to provide reduced lifecycle cost 
while simultaneously improving operational availability, Ao.  Performance-based Logistics (PBL) 
is one such program that entails the establishment of a particular kind of contractual vendor-
client relationship between a logistic-service provider and a weapon-system manager.  The 
Quadrennial Defense Review mandated the DoD implement PBL in order to, “compress the 
supply chain and improve readiness for major weapons systems and commodities” (OSD, 2001, 
56).  A key aspect of PBL contracts is their outcome focus; the client organization is supposed 
to specify key performance goals, and allow the vendor to determine the best way of obtaining 
those goals (ASN-RDA, 2003). 
This paper will not re-examine the core questions of whether PBL works, or why it works, 
as those questions have been examined extensively elsewhere (e.g., Berkowitz, et al., 2003).  
Rather, we take as our starting point the question of how best to value the desired outcomes of 
a PBL contract.  After all, as contractual vehicles, the price of the services to be provided must 
be negotiated.  Also, given a limited budget but a proactive program manager, there will always 
be more opportunities to improve logistical support for a weapon system than dollars available 
to fund those opportunities.   
We assume that opportunities to improve logistics outcomes should be valued on the 
basis of the cost-effectiveness of those opportunities.1  As in the private sector, the cost 
effectiveness of an opportunity (investment) is its mission-value-over-time (profit, in the case of 
the private sector) divided by its cost-over-time. It would thus be a mistake to take the cost 
differentials of various logistic service alternatives as a statement of value because cost in no 
way informs the value of that service to the weapon-system operator. Even if one is willing to 
assume that current expenditures are cost effective (and hence, any cost reduction would be 
even more cost effective), there is no way to assess one alternative against another without a 
direct measure of value; mere cost differentials ignore the fact that the alternatives may have 
different impacts on mission value.    
We will further assume that the mission value of a logistical service is a function of 
weapon-system performance, as neither a weapon-system component (such as a fuel cell) nor 
                                                
1 Caplice & Sheffi (1994), in reviewing a panoply of logistics metrics, categorized metrics based solely on 
comparisons of inputs (such as cost comparisons) as utilization metrics, while they categorized comparisons of 
outputs per input (such as what we are calling cost-effectiveness) as productivity metrics. They made the point that 
utilization measures are usually related to process (as opposed to performance) management. 
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a logistic element (such as spares inventory) can contribute to mission objectives except 
through the weapon system.  From a warfighter’s viewpoint, a weapon system is either capable 
of supporting a mission, or it is not.  While a fuel cell may be a necessary condition for the 
system to be mission capable, it is not a sufficient condition.   
Operational availability (Ao) is a primary metric used to determine the probability that a 
weapon system will be capable of supporting a mission.  For example, in an aircraft squadron, 
Ao of 85% implies that an average of 85% of the aircraft will be available to fly in support of 
some mission objective.  Goals are often stated for Ao levels, and mission planning must take 
Ao into account.  Moreover, neither a war fighter nor a resource manager wanting to make 
contingency plans should be content with knowing the nominal (target) or the average Ao level.  
He or she should have a sense of the distribution of Ao around the target levels: the probability 
that Ao will fall below some critical level.   
It is also possible to measure Ao for fuel cells, as well as aircraft; an improvement in Ao 
for the fuel cell will provide at least some marginal improvement in Ao for the aircraft.  But, this 
improvement will not be one-to-one; large improvements in fuel-cell availability may yield only 
trivial improvements in aircraft availability, depending not only on the failure rate of the fuel cells, 
but on the performance and availability of all the other critical components of the aircraft.  
Likewise, better fuel-cell availability will reduce the risk that a particular weapon system will not 
be operational for a particular mission, but the magnitude of that risk reduction depends on the 
probability that all the other critical components of the aircraft are available.  
Hence, the value of an improvement of component logistics can only be understood in 
terms of the performance of all the other critical components of a weapon system. Similarly, the 
value of an improvement in a single logistics element (such as spares inventory) can only be 
determined in conjunction with other key logistics elements.   
The modeling approach we will outline in this paper has applicability beyond PBL.  It is 
useful in understanding the value of component-level logistic services, or services directed at 
only a subset of logistic elements (inventory only, or depot-level repair only).  However, we 
contend that an implementation of PBL that is fully consistent with the original intent of 
performance-based service acquisition must use an approach similar to the one we outline, 
because it is impossible to put a value (and, hence, a contract price) on those services without 
such an approach. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While we are arguing for an assessment of value that will provide a more complete 
picture of the cost effectiveness of a PBL proposal (by providing a numerator to a productivity 
ratio), we recognize that an estimation of the lifecycle costs of such proposals is far from trivial. 
Outsourced logistic services for weapon systems are particularly difficult to cost; for example, 
the ongoing contract management (transaction) costs can be substantial, but are rarely 
measured (Domberger, Jensen & Stonecash, 2002).   
We think such transaction costs are particularly important in light of a recent 
Government Accountability Office report (GAO, 2004) that was critical of systems-level PBL 
contracts; this document recommended greater emphasis on PBL contracts at the component 
level, especially for commodity-type components (which, according to the GAO, reflected 
“commercial best practices”).  PBL contracts on commodities would be especially appealing 
because vendors providing commodities can expect to enjoy economies of scale that the DoD 
could not experience (as vendors would be able to offer those commodities across a broad 
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population of users).  These increased economies of scale would reduce the price of such 
services. Unfortunately, of course, aside from domestic transportation and depot-level spares 
for a relatively small set of components used commonly between defense and industry, the 
number of critical components (or logistics elements) of weapon systems that can be 
considered commodities is relatively small.  For non-commodity items, a key economic 
consideration in out-sourcing is the increase in transaction costs entailed by dealing with an 
outside vendor (Gufstafson, et al., 1996).  Such costs increase substantially when one is 
offering a PBL contract at the component level. As we will show, aside from the additional 
burden of contract maintenance for many small contracts, the proper valuation and 
management of such component-level contracts entails the development of a comprehensive 
model which incorporates key performance dimensions of all critical components.   
Perhaps in an effort to reduce such transaction costs, or perhaps in response to a 
complaint that PBL involved too many metrics, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD-ATL, 2004) recently issued guidance for PBL metrics.  While 
clearly indicating that PBL could be applied at the subsystem or major assembly level, the 
memo listed five key performance criteria:  1) weapon system operational availability, 2) weapon 
system operational reliability, 3) weapon system cost per usage, 4) logistics footprint for a 
weapon system, and 5) response time required for weapon system logistics support. 
Of course, these measures are interrelated.  We think the central non-cost measure is 
operational availability.  The other three non-cost measures can all be seen in some ways as 
subsidiary to availability.  Reliability (e.g., time to failure), footprint (e.g., number of spares and 
size of fielded or intermediate maintenance and repair facility) and response time (e.g., time to 
repair) are all critical determinants of availability.  Yet, there may be good reasons to measure 
reliability, footprint and response time separately.  For example, reliability affects not only 
availability, but also the probability of system failure in the field; likewise, footprint affects not 
only availability, but operational agility as well. However, operational availability in many ways 
summarizes reliability, response time and footprint.  We will develop a model in the next section 
that demonstrates the precise interaction between time to failure, time to repair, and spare 
inventory levels. It also demonstrates how these variables determine availability.  Thus, as they 
affect Ao, footprint, response time, and even reliability are all process and not performance 
measures.  We will focus on availability (with the caveat that it may not be the sole determinant 
of value) because it is necessary to an understanding of value. 
In specifying performance outcomes (but not processes) to a vendor, PBL contracts are 
deliberately designed to transfer some degree of operational and financial risk to a vendor 
(Doerr, Lewis & Eaton, forthcoming).  As risk transfer is an intended outcome of the initiative, 
and as the risk of falling below a certain level of operational availability is an important 
performance dimension, it is clearly important to incorporate the risk associated with operational 
availability at the system level into a measure of value.  From the warfighter’s point of view, this 
risk may be the key performance dimension (Eaton, Doerr & Lewis, forthcoming).  The 
warfighter, after all, is less concerned with the average number of mission-capable aircraft than 
he is concerned with the probability that he will have enough aircraft to fly a particular mission.  
The procedure we will outline allows the assessment of a proposed logistics improvement not 
only on the average impact that improvement would have on the operational availability of the 
aircraft, but on the risk associated with the operational availability of the aircraft as well. 
Weapon systems are, of course, the military’s key capital assets related to operational 
capacity, and the logistics services in question can be seen as primarily affecting the level of 
operational capacity available to the warfighter. The sort of risk measurement we are proposing 
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is increasingly recognized as central to the valuation of operational capacity of corporate assets 
in the private sector as well.  
Assessments of risk/return profiles for capital assets are, of course, behind the recent 
work on Real Options (Mun, 200x).  And in capacity planning in particular, the incorporation of 
risk into capacity models was listed in a recent literature review as a key area in which research 
was expected to develop (Van Miegham, 2003).  Risk-based models have recently been applied 
to the acquisition of production capacity for airfoils used in military aircraft (Prueitt & Park, 
2003).  Mostly, risk-based capacity models deal with technological, demand, or price 
uncertainty, and are not directly applicable to the valuation of logistic services and the uncertain 
impact those services will have on system availability (capacity).  The point we are making is 
that there is growing consensus that a proper valuation of capacity-related planning (such as the 
planning associated with offering a PBL contract) must include an assessment of risk.  
In this paper we develop three models as decision-support systems (Keen & Morton, 
1978; Power, 2002; Turban & Aronson 1998).  The term “decision-support system” implies use 
of computer-based systems to: 
1. assist the warfighters in their decision process in semi-structured tasks, 
2. support, rather than replace, the warfighter’s judgment, and 
3. improve the effectiveness of the practical decision-making process. 
The dramatic improvements in computer power and software capability (such as 
spreadsheet and simulation models) allow convenient access to powerful decision-support 
systems for improved decision making. Making such models available as decision-support 
systems is the primary goal of this research.  
III. MODELS 
In this section, we present two spreadsheet models and one discrete-event simulation 
model using Arena simulation language (Kelton, 2004).  The first model primarily supports 
lifecycle cost calculations but ignores the interactions among reliability, time to repair, and 
operational availability.  The second model, while it does address these basic interactions, does 
not consider the full range of lifecycle costs.  However, both the first and the second model are 
static—they can only support average case analyses and sensitivity analyses.  The third model 
incorporates the interactions among reliability, time to repair and operational availability into a 
simulation model that can support a risk analysis, but which does not directly address lifecycle 
cost issues.   
In their current form, these models are intended as a proof-of-concept only.  That is, we 
are not presenting a research case involving field data; rather, we are demonstrating the 
potential of an approach using hypothetical data. 
3.1. Spreadsheet Lifecycle Cost Model (Model 1)  
Model 1 is a compressive lifecycle cost analysis model for a hypothetical UAV 
(unmanned aerial vehicle) case study intended as a proof-of-concept for our modeling 
approaches.  This case study was adapted from Logistics Engineering class lecture notes at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (Kang, 2004). The complete case study is described in Appendix A, 
and the spreadsheet model is available from http://web.nps.navy.mil/ 
~mn4310/UAV_Model_1.xls.  
This model computes the total system lifecycle cost for major weapon systems from 
R&D to deployment to phase-out.  The lifecycle cost includes research, development, test and 
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evaluation, acquisition, production, operations and maintenance, and phase-out costs.  This 
model is a comprehensive decision-support tool for program managers. The model can be used 
to establish the baseline total ownership cost of major weapon systems during the planning, as 
well as operations, stages.  The user can conduct sensitivity analyses on various input 
parameters such as reliability, manning, training, and R&D cost.  As the user changes any of the 
parameters, the model immediately updates the total lifecycle cost, so the user can see the 
financial impact of input parameter changes in the long run. We suggest the reader download 
the spreadsheet model and change some of the parameters in the “INPUT” worksheet. 
 
 
3.2. Revised Spreadsheet Model (Model 2) and Simulation Model (Model 3) 
A shortcoming of the spreadsheet model (Model 1) is that it cannot analyze the dynamic 
relationship between reliability and operational availability. For example, deterioration in 
reliability of a certain component will decrease the system’s operational availability.  At the same 
time, the workload at a repair shop will increase, forcing the repair turnaround time to become 
longer, which in turn will decrease the operational availability of the system.  In Model 1, the 
average repair turnaround time remains the same regardless of the changes in component 
reliability.  
To overcome this limitation, we have developed a discrete-event simulation model 
(Model 3) that can be used along with a revised spreadsheet model (Model 2). Model 2 is 
essentially derived from Model 1.  It is a small-scale spreadsheet model to focus on reliability 
and maintainability. Given logistics input parameters (see Figure 1), Model 2 computes spare-
parts requirements, inventory, transportation and repair costs followed by the total maintenance 
costs over the lifecycle of the system. Model 2 does not consider R&D cost or infrastructure 
costs. It only considers variable costs while operating the weapon system.  Figure 2 shows the 
total lifecycle maintenance cost of $442,656,976 based on the input parameters in Figure 1.  To 
demonstrate how Model 2 could be used, suppose we improve the MTBF of the main display 
unit from 1,500 hours to 2,000 hours. The total cost will then be decreased to $440,319,492, 
representing approximately $2.3 million savings in maintenance cost. This is valuable 
information for the program manager when s/he makes the component-reliability improvement 
decisions.  
Figure 1. Input Parameter for Model 2 
No of Squadrons 4       
No of UAV systems per squadron 10       
No of Air Vehicles per system 4       
No of Ground Control stations per system  2       
Ground Equip Monthly Op Hrs Hours 300 hrs     
AV Flying Hours/Vehicle/month 120 hrs     
AutoLand & Launch/RecMonthly Op Hours 60 hrs     
Repair Turnaround Time 10 days     
Protection Level for Critical Components 0.95       
Protection Level for non-Critical Components 0.85       
Hourly charge for repair including material cost $500       
Transportation cost per failure $200       
Annual Inventory rate 21%       
Capital Discount rate 10%       
Lifecycle 20 years     
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Ground Control Station Components MTBF  Unit Cost  
Main Display Unit 1000 0.00100  $  500,000  Critical 
Power Supply 4000 0.00025  $  400,000  Critical 
Power Gen 3500 0.00029  $  300,000  Critical 
Air Conditioner 6000 0.00017  $  400,000  Critical 
Guidance & Control 500 0.00200  $  400,000  NonCritical 
          
Other Ground Equip MTBF  Unit Cost   
Launch & Recovery System 500 0.00200  $  1,200,000  Critical 
AutoLand System 1000 0.00100  $  2,000,000  NonCritical 
Data Terminal 3000 0.00033  $  1,000,000  NonCritical 
          
AV MTBF  Unit Cost    
Navigation/Avionics 1000 0.00100  $    200,000  Critical 
Engine 500 0.00200  $    100,000  Critical 
Propeller 500 0.00200  $      50,000  Critical 
Video Scanner 2500 0.00040  $    150,000  NonCritical 
IR Scanner 450 0.00222  $    150,000  NonCritical 
IR Data-Link 800 0.00125  $    200,000  NonCritical 
Figure 2. Sample Output of Model 2 
Annual Spare Inventory Cost  $                    2,688,000  per squadron 
Annual Repair Cost   $                    8,800,857  per squadron 
Annual Transportation cost   $                      328,034  per squadron 
       
Total cost per squadron per year   $                  11,816,891    
       
Total Annual cost    $                  47,267,566    
    
 Total Lifecycle Cost   $442,656,976   
 
Once the cost analysis is completed (using Model 2), the same input parameters are 
used for the simulation model (Model 3) to estimate the operational availability and other 
performance measures of the system (e.g., probability that the operational availability falls 
below some critical level).  Model 2 and Model 3 (simulation model) complement each other.   
3.3. Simulation Scenarios 
In this simulation model (Model 3), we only consider the critical components (engine, 
propeller, avionics computer) for a squadron of 10 UAV systems with 40 air vehicles (see 
Appendix A).   When one of these critical components fails, the faulty component is removed 
from the air vehicle, and an RFI (ready-for-issue) spare is installed.  The faulty component is 
sent to the repair shop to be fixed. After repair, it becomes an RFI spare. When a critical 
component fails, and an RFI spare is not available, the air vehicle will be grounded (and will 
become not mission capable, or NMC) until an RFI component is available. A failure of non-
critical components may degrade readiness, but the system is assumed to be operable (that is, 
mission capable or MC). 
The input parameters—such as MTBF and number of spares for each component, repair 
times (in hours), transportation delay (one way, in days)—are read from the spreadsheet (see 
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Figure 3).  When a component fails in Scenario 1, it requires 9 days (4.5 days one way) of 
transportation delay with 10 hours of repair work; this work follows a triangular distribution with a 
mode of 10 hours, an upper limit of 50% above the mode (i.e., 15 hours) and a lower limit of 
50% below the mode (i.e., 5 hours).  The waiting time at the repair shop, if any, is estimated 
inside the simulation. The repair turnaround (TAT) time of 10 hours in Figure 1 for Model 2 
approximates the repair TAT of Scenario 1.  



























1 1000 500 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 4.5 
2 1250 500 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 4.5 
3 1500 500 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 4.5 
4 1000 750 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 4.5 
5 1000 1000 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 4.5 
6 1500 1000 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 4.5 
7 1000 500 500 10 10 10 10 10 10 4.5 
8 1000 500 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 2.25 
9 1000 500 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 1 
10 1500 1000 500 4 6 6 10 10 10 1 
 
Given the input parameters in Figure 3, Model 3 simulates each scenario over 1,000,000 
hours. Multiple scenarios can be executed in one simulation run (e.g., 10 in this case). The 
results captured for each scenario are the average operational availability (Ao) for the air 
vehicles in the squadron, along with the cumulative distribution of operational availability. These 
results are tabulated in Figure 4. The cumulative distribution of operational availability is also 
depicted graphically in Figure 5.      
 
Figure 4. Simulation Output: Cumulative Operational Availability and the Average 
Operational Availability for Each Scenario 
Cumulative Operational 
Availability        




Scenario 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%  
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 2.27 32.25 90.91 100.00  0.837
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.68 28.76 88.99 100.00  0.843
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.50 27.53 88.47 100.00  0.845
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.95 20.50 84.35 100.00  0.857
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 16.50 80.87 100.00  0.865
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 11.70 75.25 100.00  0.876
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 2.27 32.43 91.39 100.00  0.837
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 3.14 52.74 100.00  0.906
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 15.37 100.00  0.948
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60% 70% '80% 90% 100%
Operational Availability
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10
 
Let’s assume that the commander’s goal is to maintain an average Ao of 85%.  He also 
knows his mission capability will be critically jeopardized if Ao falls below 80%.  Therefore, he 
wants to estimate the probability that this event might happen, maintaining the average Ao to be 
above 85%.  The results in Figure 4 show that the average Ao of Scenario 1 is 83.7% (the last 
column of Scenario 1) and the probability of Ao falling to 80% or below is 32.25% (the 9th 
column with a heading of 80% for Scenario 1).  Scenario 1 is not acceptable to the commander 
since the average Ao is below his goal, and the probability of Ao falling below 80% seems to be 
too high.  He can generate more scenarios (e.g., Scenarios 2 through 10) to assess the impact 
of changes in component reliability or logistics elements (spare parts, repair and transportation 
times) on the entire system-level Ao.   
In Scenarios 2 and 3, the MTBF of an engine is increased from 1,000 hours to 1,250 and 
1,500, respectively.  In Scenarios 4 and 5, the MTBF of a propeller is improved from 500 hours 
to 750 and 1,000, respectively. Improvement in Ao can be observed from the far right-hand side 
column of the Figure 4.  Changes in Scenarios 4 and 5 are preferred to those of Scenarios 2 
and 3. In Scenario 6, the MTBFs of both the engine and propeller are increased respectively to 
1,500 and 1,000.  The overall Ao is increased to 87.6% (from 83.7% of Scenario 1), and the 
probability of Ao falling below 80% has substantially reduced to 11.7% (from 32.25%).  Increase 
in spare parts (Scenario 7) does not improve the performance at all.  However, significant 
reduction in transportation time (Scenario 8) improves the system performance.  In Scenarios 8 
and 9, when the transportation delays are reduced from 4.5 days to 2.25 and 1 respectively, Ao 
jumps to 90.6% and 94.8%, respectively; likewise, the probabilities of Ao falling below 80% drop 
to 3.14% and 0.08%, respectively.  The Scenario 10 is the same as Scenario 9 except that the 
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MTBFs of an engine and a propeller are increased to 1,500 and 1,000, respectively.  Ao hits 
96.2% with the probability of Ao falling below 80% now negligible (0.02%).  
The parameters in Scenarios 2 through 10 can be input to Model 2 to compute the total 
maintenance cost for each scenario.  For example, by entering the parameters from Scenario 
10 into Model 2 in Figure 2, a PM will note results in a total lifecycle maintenance cost of 
$375,712,781 (i.e., savings of approximately $120 million over the base case of Scenario 1).  
Scenario 10 provides an Ao 12.5% higher than Scenario 1 (from 83.7% to 96.25%) with the risk 
of Ao falling below 80% becoming a non-issue.   
Models 2 and 3 can potentially serve as a communication tool between the budget 
community and warfighters. When reliability improvements are made on several components in 
a complex system, the warfighter’s primary concern is readiness, or Ao, while the budget 
analysts’ focus is on financial implications.  These two models provide valuable solutions to both 
communities.   
IV. SUMMARY 
Providing reduced lifecycle cost and, at the same time, improving operational availability 
are fundamental goals of the Performance-based Logistics (PBL) and other logistics initiatives 
of the U.S. Department of Defense.  In many PBL contracts, the contractual arrangements are 
typically stipulated at the level of individual components (such as a fuel cell) or a logistic 
element (such as inventory of certain spare parts).  While achieving component-level 
performance goals is certainly important, what really matters to a warfighter is the operational 
availability of the weapon system.  Hence, there is a need to develop a methodology and an 
apparatus for estimating the operational availability (Ao) of a weapon system based on the 
component-level reliability and maintainability data.  This current research is aimed at this need.  
Specifically, we present two spreadsheet models and one discrete-event simulation 
model using Arena simulation language.  The first model primarily supports lifecycle cost 
calculations, but ignores the interactions among reliability, time to repair, and operational 
availability.  The second model, while it does address these basic interactions, does not 
consider the full range of lifecycle costs.  However, both the first and the second model are 
static—they can only support average case analyses and sensitivity analyses.  The third model 
incorporates the interactions among reliability, time to repair and operational availability into a 
simulation model that can support a weapon-system-level risk analysis.  In their current form, 
these models are developed as a proof-of-concept. That is, we are not presenting a research 
case involving field data, but rather are demonstrating the potential methodology and a tool 
using hypothetical, yet realistic, data.  
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Case Study 
A UAV system consists of four air vehicles (AV's), two ground-control stations (GCSs), 
modular mission payloads (MMPs), data links, remote data terminals (RDTs) and an automatic 
landing system.  A total of 8 squadrons (two squadrons in each coast of CONUS, and one each 
for Pacific, Indian, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Oceans) will be established to accommodate the 
new system. Each squadron will have its own intermediate-level maintenance capabilities.  
Each squadron will have 10 VTUAV systems.  Detachment personnel (for each UAV system) 
will consist of three officers (one OIC and two mission officers), three Chief Petty Officers 
(CPOs) and 12 enlisted.  I-Level Maintenance personnel will consist of one officer, one Chief 
petty officer and ten enlisted. Squadron headquarters personnel will be made up of seven 
officers, ten CPOs and twenty enlisted. Composite costs for personnel are estimated as follows:  
Officer—$140,000 per year, CPO—$115,000 per year, Enlisted—$70,000 per year.  
Production begins in Fiscal Year 2004, with all VTUAV's scheduled for field tesing in the 
year following their production.  A total of 80 VTUAV systems will be produced; the life-cycle of 
the program is estimated to be 30 years (2005-2034).  The risk of loss of an AV in peace time is 
2-7% per year, while the risk of loss of an AV in operation during a contingency is 15-30% per 
year.  A chance of a contingency during the life-cycle of the program is 15% per year.  Lost AVs 
will be replaced the next year.  However, no orders for replacement AVs will be placed last 5 
years of the life-cycle (i.e., YR 2025 – 2029).  We are assuming by then new UAV systems will 
gradually replace the current ones.   
Research and development costs are $15 million for FY 01, $20 million in FY 02 and $50 
million in FYs 03 and 04.  The marginal production cost of AV (with payload) is $1 million. The 
cost of maintaining a production capability throughout the life of the system is $12 M per year for 
every year any aerial vehicles are produced.  Thus, the annual production cost of AV is $12M + 
$1M * (# of AV produced).  Ground-Control Equipment, which consists of two GCSs, RDTs, test 
equipment and an automatic landing system, will cost $20 million per system.  The I-level 
operating cost is $6 million/yr per I-level plus an additional one-time capital investment of $25 
million (including installation of test equipment) prior to the year of operation.  A capital discount 
rate of 10%/yr the inflation rate of 4%/yr will be used.  
Billet requirements are based on all personnel fully qualified/current/certified to perform 
all missions/Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC)/Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  
Operators are required to have functional applications of the use and control of the UAV, and 
will be trained in operation of all aspects of the UAV navigation, launch flight control and 
recovery.  Officers and CPOs will attend additional training on preflight planning, mission profile 
construction and UAV tactical-intelligence integration.  Costs for the training will be 
$1,600/person/week for the basic training and $3,000/ person/week for the advanced training.  
An attrition rate of 25% per year is used after the first year, including personnel rotation.  
Required training is as follows: 
Detachment personnel  
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  Basic UAV Training (Officers, CPOs, junior enlisted):  10 weeks 
  Advance Training (Officers and CPOs only):  5 weeks 
 I-Level Maintenance personnel 
  Basic Maintenance Training (Officers, CPOs, junior enlisted):  20 weeks 
  Advance Maintenance Training (Officers and CPOs only):  5 weeks 
 Squadron Headquarters personnel 
  Basic UAV intelligence course (Officers, CPOs, junior enlisted): 10 weeks 
  Advance Training (Officers and CPOs only):  5 weeks 
Spare parts management will be consolidated at the I-Level on a one-for-one exchange.  
We will assume that the transportation cost is $100 per shipment (i.e., $ 200 per failure).  
Spares replacement and repair materials cost will be equal to 50% of the value of spares per 
year.  Sparing levels will be as follows: critical units—95% and non-critical units— 85%.  
Maintenance turnaround time (TAT), including transportation delays, for I-Level is 10 days and 
D-Level is 40 days.  It is assumed that 80% of failures can be repaired at the I-Level (thus 20% 
at the D-level).  Spare-level calculations are based on "t =10 (0.8) + 40 (0.2) = 16 days."  D-
Level cost is estimated to be $5,000 per repair including the transportation costs.  Ground 
equipment is expected to operate 300 hours per month; the AV flying hour is estimated at 120 
hours per month per vehicle.  The launch/recovery and the auto-landing systems are used 20% 
of the time the ground-control station is in operation (i.e., 60 hours per month). POL (petroleum, 
oil and lubricant) costs are estimated at $60 per flight hour.  The MTBF of each component, its 
cost, and the required protection level (customer service level) are included as follows: 
 
MTBF      Cost         Criticality   
 I. Ground Station (2 per VTUAV system)  
  Main Display Unit   1,500 hrs  $   500,000   critical 
  Power Supply    4,000 hrs $   400,000   critical  
  Power Generator   3,500 hrs  $   300,000   critical 
  Air Conditioner   6,000 hrs  $   400,000   critical 
  Guidance & Control      500 hrs $   400,000   non-critical 
 
     II. Other Ground Equipment (1 per VTUAV system)  
 Launch/Recovery System      500 hrs  $1,200,000   critical 
 Auto-landing System    1,000 hrs  $2,000,000   non-critical 
 Data Terminal     3,000 hrs $1,000,000    non-critical 
 
    III. AV and Payload 
 Engine            500 hrs $   100,000   critical  
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 Propeller           500 hrs $     50,000   critical 
 Navigation/avionics       1,000 hrs $   200,000   critical  
Video Scanner       2,500 hrs $   150,000   non-critical 
 IR Scanner           450 hrs  $   150,000   non-critical 
 IR Data-Link           800 hrs $   200,000   non-critical 
 
The System activation/deactivation plan is as follows:  
System Activation plan: FY 2005 - 20 systems 
      (2 squadrons at a time) FY 2006 - 20 systems 
     FY 2007 - 20 systems 
     FY 2008 - 20 systems 
 
 System Deactivation:  FY 2031 - 20 systems 
     (phase-out) plan   FY 2032 - 20 systems 
     (2 squadrons at a time) FY 2033 - 20 systems  
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